Light 寫: ↑週二 12月 03, 2019 7:38 am
所謂的朝鮮裔解放軍本來就是中國人，跟金日成沒有關係。他們都是從東北朝鮮族聚居區招募進共軍的，跟從北韓過來的「朝鮮義勇軍」不同。「朝鮮義勇軍」才兩三千人，在1947年就已經回北韓了。
這些解放軍官兵眼看着內戰勝利，都想要復員回家，一些軍官還想着這下可以進城任職了。然後老毛把這些人派給金日成，官方說法是“他們主動請願要回朝鮮搞革命”。命令已經下了，不主動也是主動。
打完韓戰，這批朝鮮族解放軍大約損失半數，剩下大約一半留在北韓（金日成因北韓男人死得太多，請求中國讓他們留下，還特地派人勸說），另一半不願留下的回中國，大約有一萬人。
誰說美軍準備推進中國？1950年10月初，中國高層討論參戰與否，所有的人都反對出兵參戰，他們不認爲美軍會推進中國，最多到鴨綠江。別忘了當時還有蘇聯在一側虎視眈眈，美國人犯傻了纔會進攻中國。但幾天後老毛獨斷決定出兵參戰，讓已經飛到莫斯科向史達林解釋爲何中國不能出兵的周恩來當場傻眼。
今天的越南和中國不都是跟美國緩解才起來的？
二戰時期朝鮮半島是日本殖民地,滿州國是日本的魁儡政府(1932-1945),兩者涵蓋了整個東北以及朝鮮半島.
當時金日成在哪活動?滿州國與北朝鮮.
在二戰結束前的東北朝鮮族自認自己是中國人的有多少?
老毛活動範圍有涵蓋東北嗎?那這些朝鮮隊伍即使在PLA的旗幟下是在和誰並肩作戰?
它們會比較認同老毛還是金日成?
也因此我認為將這些名義上隸屬PLA的朝鮮軍隊交給金日成是合理的
戰後有些回東北也很合理
在十月初麥克阿瑟認為盟軍勢不可擋,認為把朝鮮戰爭推進中國領土才能阻斷後續北朝鮮軍的人員物資.這和杜魯門總統的底線有衝突,麥克阿瑟堅持要杜魯門來朝鮮會談.將軍的氣勢比總統還大.
周恩來與老毛並沒有不同調,老共早就訂下打進朝鮮半島的策略,這在戰爭開始時就決定了.在出兵之際,林彪怯戰,最後由彭德懷領軍.而且史達林與周毛也沒有不同調,只是戰前沒有那麼熱心.
以下摘錄在
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War
Although Kim's early successes led him to predict he would end the war by the end of August, Chinese leaders were more pessimistic. To counter a possible US deployment, Zhou Enlai secured a Soviet commitment to have the Soviet Union support Chinese forces with air cover, and deployed 260,000 soldiers along the Korean border
Taking advantage of the UN Command's strategic momentum against the communists, General MacArthur believed it necessary to extend the Korean War into China to destroy depots supplying the North Korean war effort. President Truman disagreed, and ordered caution at the Sino-Korean border.[206]
Meanwhile, on 15 October 1950, President Truman and General MacArthur met at Wake Island. This meeting was much publicized because of the General's discourteous refusal to meet the President on the continental United States.[221] To President Truman, MacArthur speculated there was little risk of Chinese intervention in Korea,[222] and that the PRC's opportunity for aiding the KPA had lapsed. He believed the PRC had some 300,000 soldiers in Manchuria, and some 100,000–125,000 soldiers at the Yalu River. He further concluded that, although half of those forces might cross south, "if the Chinese tried to get down to Pyongyang, there would be the greatest slaughter" without air force protection.[191][223]
From the beginning of the conflict, the People's Republic of China had been preparing to invade Korea if they deemed it necessary.
In a series of emergency meetings that lasted from 2 to 5 October, Chinese leaders debated whether to send Chinese troops into Korea. There was considerable resistance among many leaders, including senior military leaders, to confronting the US in Korea.[210] Mao strongly supported intervention, and Zhou was one of the few Chinese leaders who firmly supported him. After Lin Biao politely refused Mao's offer to command Chinese forces in Korea (citing his upcoming medical treatment),[211] Mao decided that Peng Dehuai would be the commander of the Chinese forces in Korea after Peng agreed to support Mao's position.[211] Mao then asked Peng to speak in favor of intervention to the rest of the Chinese leaders. After Peng made the case that if US troops conquered Korea and reached the Yalu they might cross it and invade China, the Politburo agreed to intervene in Korea.[212]
To enlist Stalin's support, Zhou and a Chinese delegation arrived in Moscow on 10 October, at which point they flew to Stalin's home on the Black Sea.[215] There they conferred with the top Soviet leadership, which included Joseph Stalin as well as Vyacheslav Molotov, Lavrentiy Beria and Georgy Malenkov. Stalin initially agreed to send military equipment and ammunition, but warned Zhou that the Soviet Air Force would need two or three months to prepare any operations. In a subsequent meeting, Stalin told Zhou that he would only provide China with equipment on a credit basis, and that the Soviet Air Force would only operate over Chinese airspace, and only after an undisclosed period of time.
